SEC-03 / OT Security

IEC 62443 zones and conduits: a walkthrough for a mid-size plant

Zones group assets that share security requirements; conduits are the controlled paths between them. IEC 62443-3-2 gives a repeatable process to draw them, set a target security level for each, and document the requirements.

8 min read Updated OT engineersControls engineersCISOsSystem integrators

Key takeaways

  • IEC 62443-3-2 defines seven zone and conduit requirements (ZCR 1 to ZCR 7), from identifying the system under consideration to asset owner approval.
  • Start from function and consequence, then separate business from control, safety from basic control, and anything reached via external networks.
  • Target security level (SL-T) is chosen per zone and conduit from the detailed risk assessment, not copied from a template.
  • For a typical mid-size plant, eight to ten zones is a realistic first design, including a separate zone for AI and analytics edge devices.

Zones and conduits are the core design idea of IEC 62443. Instead of one big flat control network with a firewall to the office, you group assets by shared security requirements and control every path between groups. This walkthrough applies the IEC 62443-3-2 process to a realistic mid-size plant, including where AI and analytics edge devices fit.

The terms, briefly

  • Zone: a grouping of assets that share common security requirements.
  • Conduit: a grouping of communication channels between zones that share security requirements. Physically, usually a firewall, its rule set and the cabling and switches behind it. See conduit.
  • System under consideration (SUC): the scope you are assessing, for example one plant.
  • Security level (SL): in IEC 62443-3-2, a measure of confidence that the SUC, zone or conduit is free from vulnerabilities and functions as intended. See security level.
  • Target security level (SL-T): the level you want a zone or conduit to achieve, set from risk.

The four security levels, as described in IEC 62443-3-3, map roughly to the attacker you need to resist:

Level Resists Plant-floor shorthand
SL 1 Casual or coincidental violation Mistakes, curious staff, accidental malware
SL 2 Intentional violation with simple means, low resources, generic skills Opportunistic ransomware, unskilled attackers
SL 3 Intentional violation with sophisticated means, moderate resources, IACS-specific skills Organized criminals targeting manufacturing
SL 4 Intentional violation with sophisticated means, extended resources, IACS-specific skills Well-resourced, state-level actors

The IEC 62443-3-2 process

IEC 62443-3-2:2020 sets out seven zone and conduit requirements (ZCRs). In plain terms:

Step ZCR What you do
1 ZCR 1: Identify the SUC Define scope, perimeter and access points
2 ZCR 2: Initial cyber security risk assessment Worst-case consequence if compromised, before controls
3 ZCR 3: Partition into zones and conduits Group assets; separate business from IACS, safety, temporary, wireless and externally connected devices
4 ZCR 4: Risk comparison Compare initial risk with tolerable risk
5 ZCR 5: Detailed cyber security risk assessment Threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, likelihood; determine SL-T; evaluate countermeasures and residual risk
6 ZCR 6: Document requirements, assumptions and constraints Cyber security requirements specification, drawings, zone and conduit characteristics, tolerable risk
7 ZCR 7: Asset owner approval The asset owner signs off

ZCR 3 is worth reading closely. Its sub-requirements say to separate business and IACS assets, safety-related assets, temporarily connected devices, wireless devices and devices connected via external networks. That list alone gives you most of your first-draft zones.

Worked example: a mid-size plant

The plant: a 400-person metal components manufacturer. Three production lines (machining, heat treatment, assembly and packaging), a paint shop with a burner management system, a site MES and historian, ERP at head office. OEMs support the heat treatment furnaces and packaging robots remotely. A vision inspection system with a trained model runs on assembly, and a predictive maintenance pilot streams vibration data to a cloud platform.

Step 1: identify the SUC

Scope: everything on the plant's OT network, the industrial DMZ, and the conduits to head office IT and to the internet. Access points: the IT/OT firewall, two OEM remote access paths, a cellular router on the furnace skid, and the cloud connection for the maintenance pilot.

Step 2: initial risk assessment

Ask, for each area, what the worst credible consequence of compromise is. Heat treatment and the paint shop burner management have safety consequences. Machining and assembly have production and quality consequences. The MES has plant-wide availability impact. The AI systems have quality and availability impact.

Step 3: partition

        [Z1 Enterprise IT]      [Internet / cloud]
               |C1                    |C2
     +---------+----------------------+---------+
     | Z2 Industrial DMZ (L3.5)                  |
     |  historian replica, broker, patch staging |
     +----+-----------------+-------------+------+
          |C3               |C4           |C5
   +------+-------+   +-----+------+  +---+-------------+
   | Z3 Site ops  |   | Z8 Vendor  |  | Z9 AI/analytics |
   | MES,         |   | remote     |  | edge: vision,   |
   | historian    |   | access     |  | PdM gateway     |
   +--+----+---+--+   +-----+------+  +---+-------------+
      |C6  |C6 |C6          |C7 (named    |C8
      |    |   |            |   assets)   |
   +--+-+ ++---+-+ +---+----+---+         |
   | Z4 | | Z5   | | Z6 Assy /  |<--------+
   |Mach| | Heat | |  packaging |
   +----+ +--+---+ +------------+
             |C9
       +-----+------------+
       | Z7 Safety: BMS,  |
       | SIS (separate)   |
       +------------------+

Step 4 and 5: compare risk, then detailed assessment and SL-T

The initial risk for heat treatment, the paint shop and the DMZ exceeds tolerable risk, so they get a detailed assessment first. The result for this example:

Zone Contents Purdue Main consequence SL-T Key controls
Z1 Enterprise IT ERP, office, email L4/5 Business disruption, entry point Managed under IT ISMS Not in OT scope; conduit C1 controls
Z2 Industrial DMZ Historian replica, MQTT broker, patch staging, jump host L3.5 Pivot into OT SL 2 Hardened servers, no pass-through, logging
Z3 Site operations MES, historian, OT domain, engineering workstations L3 Plant-wide stop SL 2 Allowlisting, backups, admin via jump host
Z4 Machining cell CNC, PLCs, HMIs L1/2 Line stop, scrap SL 1 VLAN/ACL, USB control, program backups
Z5 Heat treatment Furnace PLCs, HMI, recipe server L1/2 Quality, equipment damage SL 2 Industrial firewall, recipe change control
Z6 Assembly and packaging PLCs, robots, HMIs L1/2 Line stop, quality SL 1 VLAN/ACL, program backups
Z7 Safety Burner management, SIS, safety PLCs L1 (SIS) Fire, injury SL 2 or higher, per process safety review Independent network, read-only conduit, physical keyswitch
Z8 Vendor remote access Broker, recording L3.5 Unauthorized changes SL 2 MFA, just-in-time, recording
Z9 AI/analytics edge Vision inference PC, PdM gateway L2/3 Wrong QC decisions, pivot SL 2 Read-only data sources, outbound only via DMZ, signed model updates

Note: These SL-T values are illustrative for this example plant. Your values come from your own detailed risk assessment against your own tolerable risk, which is what ZCR 5 requires.

Conduits

Conduit Between Allowed traffic Implementation
C1 Z1 and Z2 IT users to historian replica; patch downloads to staging Firewall, sessions terminate in DMZ
C2 Internet and Z2 Outbound only from broker to cloud AI platform; vendor access to broker Firewall, TLS, MFA on broker
C3 Z2 and Z3 Historian replication outbound; patches pulled from staging Firewall, OT-initiated
C4 Z2 and Z8 Vendor sessions Within DMZ, separate segment
C5 Z2 and Z9 Edge publishes to broker Outbound only
C6 Z3 and Z4/Z5/Z6 SCADA polling, MES orders, historian collection Firewall or ACL per zone
C7 Z8 and target zones Approved sessions to named assets Broker-relayed, time-bound
C8 Z9 and Z6 Camera images and OPC UA reads; reject signal to line PLC Firewall, specific ports, logged
C9 Z5 and Z7 Read-only status from safety system Unidirectional where possible

The vision system's reject signal in C8 is the one place AI influences control. Keep it narrow: one signal, enforced limits in the line PLC, and a manual inspection fallback. See securing AI in OT networks.

Steps 6 and 7: document and approve

Write up the requirements specification: the SUC description, zone and conduit drawings, each zone's characteristics and SL-T, operating and threat assumptions, policies, tolerable risk and regulatory requirements. The plant manager, as the asset owner representative, approves it. Use the zones and conduits worksheet to capture all of this in one place.

Mid-market shortcuts that are fine

  • Use the Purdue levels as your first draft of zones. See the Purdue model and AI.
  • Group similar lines into one zone where consequences match. You can split later.
  • Start conduit enforcement at the IT/OT boundary and the safety zone. Line separation can follow during shutdowns.
  • Accept documented gaps between SL-T and current capability, with a remediation date and an owner.

Watch out: Drawing zones on a diagram is not segmentation. If the switch still routes everything to everything, you have documentation, not a control. Verify with traffic captures after each change.

What good looks like

  • A signed requirements document with zones, conduits, SL-T values and assumptions.
  • Firewall rule sets that match the conduit table, reviewed at least annually.
  • Every new device or connection, including vendor and AI systems, assigned to a zone through change management.
  • An OT asset inventory with a zone field for every asset.

Effort and cost

For a single mid-size plant, the assessment and design typically take four to eight weeks of part-time effort from an OT engineer and a facilitator, plus workshops with operations and process safety. Implementation cost depends on what you already have: managed switches and a DMZ firewall pair cover a lot. Industrial firewalls for higher-SL zones are the main capital item.

Common mistakes

  • Copying SL-T values from another site or a vendor template.
  • Leaving the safety system on the same network as basic control.
  • Forgetting temporary devices: maintenance laptops, USB drives, vendor test kits.
  • Putting the AI edge device inside a production zone with full access.
  • Not including vendor remote access as its own zone.

Monday-morning checklist

  1. Define your SUC for one plant and list its access points.
  2. Draft zones using the ZCR 3 separations: business vs control, safety, temporary, wireless, external.
  3. Add a zone for vendor remote access and one for AI and analytics edge devices.
  4. List every conduit and the traffic it should carry.
  5. Schedule a detailed risk assessment workshop for your highest-consequence zone.
  6. Open the zones and conduits worksheet and start filling in the tables.

Sources and further reading

  1. IEC 62443-3-2:2020, Security risk assessment for system design (IEC Webstore)
  2. ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards (ISA)
  3. Leveraging ISA 62443-3-2 for IACS risk assessment (ISA Global Cybersecurity Alliance)
  4. Foundations for OT Cybersecurity: Asset Inventory Guidance (CISA and partners, Aug 2025)

This guide is general information for manufacturers, not legal advice. Confirm regulatory obligations with qualified counsel.

FAQ

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between a zone and a conduit in IEC 62443?

A zone is a group of assets that share the same security requirements, such as all the controllers and HMIs on one packaging line. A conduit is the logical grouping of communication channels between zones, with its own security requirements. In practice, a conduit is usually implemented with a firewall, its rules and any protocol break such as a DMZ server, plus the cabling and switches that carry the traffic.

How do I choose the target security level for a zone?

IEC 62443-3-2 sets the target security level (SL-T) during the detailed risk assessment, based on threats, vulnerabilities, consequences and tolerable risk. Security levels describe the type of attacker a zone must resist, from casual or accidental violation at SL 1 up to sophisticated, well-resourced attackers at SL 4. Most mid-market plants land at SL 1 or 2 for most zones, with SL 2 or 3 for safety and critical process zones.

Can a zone span multiple Purdue levels?

Yes. Zones are based on shared security requirements, not Purdue levels. A machine cell might include Level 1 PLCs and a Level 2 HMI in one zone because they share criticality and are managed together. Equally, one Purdue level can contain several zones, such as separate zones for each production line at Level 2. Purdue is a useful first draft, not the final answer.

Do I need to buy new firewalls for every zone?

Not necessarily. Start with the boundaries that cut the most risk: IT to DMZ, DMZ to OT, and safety systems. Line-level separation can use existing managed switches with VLANs and access control lists where the risk allows, moving to industrial firewalls for higher target security levels. Document compensating controls where a boundary is weaker than the target.

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